While anti-nuclear weapons activism in Britain and other nations has received considerable historiographical attention, its transnational professional dimensions have so far been neglected. This article thus introduces the concept of "transnational professional activism" to describe the ways in which scientific and medical professionals, driven by professional ethos and etiquette, and based on their self-fashioned expert identities, organized themselves into national interest groups situated within wider transnational networks in order to act against the perceived threat that nuclear war posed to human society. Through a comparative analysis of the activism of two key groups of atomic scientists and medical professionals at two key moments of the Cold War in Britain, the first Western European nation to acquire nuclear arms, this study examines shifts in the nature of transnational professional activism. The Atomic Scientists' Association, with its promotion of the international control of nuclear energy from 1945 to 1948, and the Medical Campaign Against Nuclear Weapons, which analyzed the anticipated medical effects of nuclear war in the years from 1980 to 1985, are at the center of this analysis.
The existence of nuclear weapons, coupled with periods of increased tensions between the superpowers in the Cold War, had a profound impact on the political activism of scientific and medical professionals in Britain. These groups refashioned their professional identities, calibrated their moral compasses, and formed nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in science and medicine to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war. Scientists and medical professionals often operated within larger networks that transcended national boundaries and even the geopolitical and ideological fault lines of the Cold War. Yet, historians have largely overlooked the crucial roles that they played in anti-nuclear weapons activism. 1 ethos and etiquette and based on their self-fashioned expert identities, organized themselves into national interest groups that worked within wider transnational networks to act against the perceived threat that nuclear war posed to human society. 2 The present article draws inspiration from scholarship on professionalism, professional identities, and expertise more generally, as well as on transnational activism (often focusing on human rights or environmental concerns), NGOs, the public health movement, and medical activism and inequity. 3 However, it does not attempt to gauge the impact of transnational professional activism-a problematic task-but is rather concerned with the ways in which this activism manifested itself and changed over the course of the Cold War.
For heuristic purposes, this study focuses on two stages in the development of transnational professional anti-nuclear weapons activism in Britain, the first Western European nation to acquire atomic arms. Through an exploration of the attempts by two key British occupational groups to prevent nuclear war at two crucial moments of the Cold War, it demonstrates how transnational professional activism shifted over time, thereby uncovering the specific roles that professionals played in anti-nuclear weapons activism. This article focuses first on the Atomic Scientists' Association (ASA), the chief body of nuclear scientists in Britain in the early Cold War, and its promotion of the international control of atomic energy during the 1945-1948 period. It compares this activism to that of the Medical Campaign Against Nuclear Weapons (MCANW), the country's most prominent group of concerned medical professionals, which sought to study the anticipated medical effects of nuclear war during the early 1980s.
Despite differences in their members' disciplinary backgrounds and the historical contexts in which they operated, the ASA and MCANW shared some ideologies and motivations. In their approaches to transnational professional activism, the two organizations resembled "progressive professionals," as Christopher Moores classifies activist professionals who positioned themselves conceptually in between non-political insider pressure groups and more politicized mass movements such as the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND). 4 As "progressive professionals," the ASA and MCANW faced similar difficulties in defining the political and operating politically-two central characteristics of their anti-nuclear weapons activism. Moreover, at a very general level of abstraction, the specter of nuclear war framed their actions; their work for the prevention of nuclear war appeared to be grounded in similar moral regimes that originated from their occupational involvement in preparations for atomic warfare. If many ASA members contributed to the creation of the first atom bombs during the Second World War, many medical professionals-albeit in more abstract and hypothetical ways-were involved in civil defense planning for future scenarios of nuclear war in the 1980s.
Yet, as this article shows, the ASA's and MCANW's moral regimes differed fundamentally from one another, reflecting the different Cold War contexts in which they worked. To a large extent, this variance was the result of the organizations' different views of the "nuclear taboo"-the idea that nuclear weapons must never be used-which was both a chief motivation for and legitimization of their efforts to prevent nuclear war. 5 In its quest for the international control of nuclear energy, the ASA was active during the transitional period from the Second World War to the Cold War, when the "nuclear taboo" was still evolving, the United States held a monopoly on nuclear weaponry, and the formation of an anti-nuclear weapons mass movement still lay about a decade in the future. This period spanned the years from the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, through the failed attempts by the United Nations (UN) to establish a system of international control of atomic energy in 1946, to the end of these debates and the classification of atomic arms as "weapons of mass destruction" by the UN's Commission for Conventional Armaments in 1948. 6 Out of the social responsibility that they perceived as having emanated from their wartime work on nuclear arms, sixteen scientists, including Patrick Blackett, Harrie Massey, Marcus Oliphant, Rudolf Peierls, and Joseph Rotblat, formed the ASA in March 1946. 7 Alongside the international control of atomic energy, its chief objectives included both informing and educating the public and advising political decision-makers on civilian and military aspects of nuclear power. With some 140 full and 500 associate members at its peak, the ASA remained a relatively small organization throughout its existence. 8 By contrast, MCANW was active during the so-called Second Cold War from the late 1970s to the mid-1980s when the "nuclear taboo" was fully established. As a consequence of rising tensions between the superpowers, the perceived threat of nuclear war intensified during these years. Especially in the wake of the "double track" decision by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), mass protests against the deployment of American intermediate-range nuclear weapons to Britain and other NATO member states erupted across Western Europe. British medical professionals thus founded MCANW in 1980, based on their professional code of ethics. 9 Besides the existing Medical Association for the Prevention of War (MAPW), MCANW affiliated itself to the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW)-the main umbrella organization of the transnational medical movement against nuclear war.
10 By comparison with the ASA, MCANW represented a much larger membership, growing from about 1,100 in October 1981 to some 3,500 by September 1985. 11 Focusing on MCANW's investigation into the anticipated medical effects of nuclear war, its main area of expertise, this study traces MCANW's activities in the period from its formation in 1980 until 1985 when the group started to widen its agenda beyond this single programmatic issue. In contrast to the ASA experience in the 1940s, the very different Cold War context of the early 1980s shaped a professional anti-nuclear weapons movement that was both more politicized and more transnationally engaged. 12 
Foundations of Transnational Professional Activism
A set of organizational and ideological pillars that formed the foundations of the ASA's and MCANW's quest to avert nuclear war is crucial for understanding their actions. While some of these evolved independently of the Cold War framework and followed their own logic, the Cold War rendered some of these ideological and organizational foundations of transnational professional activism political and brought the ASA and MCANW into conflict with British government interests, as will be shown below. On a conceptual level, the ASA's and MCANW's anti-nuclear weapons activism dovetailed with Harold Perkin's notions of "professional society" and "professional elites." In particular their self-fashioning of expert identities contained elements of Perkin's "professional society," characterized by a marked preference of experts over the untrained and the unskilled. 13 In order to maintain their standing as "professional elites," the ASA and MCANW embodied "thought collectives," disseminating specific scientific and medical "thought styles." 14 Ultimately, these "thought collectives" contributed to what Peter Haas terms transnational "epistemic communities," knowledge-based expert networks that served these two organizations as communication links for the proliferation of information relevant to their causes. 15 The ASA's and MCANW's self-fashioned identities as expert organizations formed part of the modernization and professionalization processes that took place in postwar Britain and that radically improved the social standing of experts and the role of professional ethics. The secularization of British society contributed to this shift by tending to replace faith with expertise as one of the fundamental tenets of the work of NGOs. By focusing on single issues like the international control of nuclear energy or the medical consequences of nuclear war, the ASA and MCANW pragmatically positioned themselves as expert authorities on these matters. 16 To safeguard their elite status as experts, the two organizations pursued a stringent politics of exclusion. While CND and other groups of the anti-nuclear weapons mass movement accepted members from all professional backgrounds, the ASA's and MCANW's membership delineated along occupational lines. The ASA only admitted "atomic scientists" to full membership status. Although MCANW was, according to its constitution, "open to all health care workers and students of the health care professions," physicians dominated the group in practice. In an attempt to generate additional funds without jeopardizing their standing as expert organizations, the ASA and MCANW permitted nonexperts-groups and individuals-to affiliate to their organizations as "associate members" or "Friends of MCANW," respectively. 17 The ASA and MCANW also used their status as "professional elites" to gain access to high-level political decision-makers and to inform or educate the public about their objectives. Some of MCANW's and the ASA's strategies to promote their agendas resembled those of the broader anti-nuclear weapons movement, albeit through a top-down approach. This applied to their attempts to build "societal pressure," as Nina Tannenwald generally observes, by "identifying problems, providing information, framing issues, and shaping discourse."
18 To these ends, the ASA sought to recruit "useful people" in leading positions in the clergy, unions, higher education, or other important societal roles as "associate members." 19 In a similar fashion, MCANW sought to raise its public profile by electing John Humphrey, a well-renowned immunologist, as its first president. Such a publicity-oriented approach was common to NGO work. 20 Apart from publicity, the status of nuclear scientists and medical professionals as independent experts also located them in a powerful position as intermediaries between the British state and society. 21 The ASA members Patrick Blackett, Sir John Cockcroft, and Sir George Thomson, for example, used their membership in the governmental Advisory Committee on Atomic Energy to promote the association's objectives to high-ranking government officials. 22 In a similar fashion, a programmatic article by IPPNW cofounder Bernard Lown and others argued that medical professionals occupied an altruistic "educational role in society on all issues pertinent to health and life." Together with their highlevel analytical skills, their roles as intermediaries made them "a natural constituency-a potentially forceful, non-political pressure group" to work for the prevention of nuclear war. 23 In line with this self-perceived educational role and based on their professional expertise, the application of a preventative medical approach, as a form of prophylaxis, to the nuclear arms race became a chief characteristic of MCANW's activism to avert nuclear war. This found expression in the so-called "prescriptions" that the group frequently issued in conjunction with IPPNW as a diagnosis of and remedy for the nuclear arms race. 24 Alongside professional exclusivity, a struggle with defining the limits of the political influenced the ways in which MCANW and the ASA fashioned their professional identities as independent experts. From the nineteenth century onward, British intellectuals such as philosopher Bertrand Russell often perceived themselves as "public moralists." By contrast, the ASA and MCANW adopted an ambiguous approach of applying supposedly objective scientific investigation to political matters. 25 On a basic level, a universal ideology of objective science, shared by scientific and medical experts around the world, informed this concept. While its practitioners applied principles of "objective" scientific investigation and medical diagnosis to social and political issues, they often made value statements that were, in fact, politically charged. 26 The concomitant of a self-fashioned professional identity as an objective expert organization was the risk of a substantial loss of credibility owing to a failure to take definite political positions, for either overtly politicized or blatantly neutral statements could impinge upon the trustworthiness of the ASA and MCANW as independent and objective expert authorities. 27 And it appeared that finding the right balance between objectivity and politicization proved to be an existential question for expert activist groups. Consequently, MCANW's and the ASA's objective approaches to political matters were not undisputed among their members. Internal discussions often centered on the decisive role that trust in authority, as a crucial underlying prerequisite of their objective scientific and medical expertise, played in the formation of their members' identities as professional activists. 28 That such groups commonly faced antiintellectualism further complicated their work. 29 The ASA's and MCANW's reliance on objectivity partly reflected the multiple allegiances held by some of their members. Since the boundaries separating members' different-and at times conflicting-loyalties were often fluid, a depoliticized approach frequently forced itself upon such professional activist organizations to avoid members' conflicts of interest. 30 The roles that John Cockcroft and other ASA officers simultaneously held in the association and government employment prompted the group on numerous occasions to steer away from politicized motions to avoid loyalty clashes. But this entanglement with the government also led the ASA to compromise its independence: in an attempt to build rapport with government offices, the group forwarded statements on contentious issues to the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority, the government agency in charge of nuclear energy, for approval ahead of their publication. 31 In MCANW's case, community physicians found themselves in a situation that was comparable to that of government employees in the ASA because these medical professionals participated in government planning for civil defense. 32 At the same time, questions of partiality versus impartiality reflected a longstanding tension between national and international allegiances that scientists had faced at least since the late nineteenth century and that repeatedly brought them into conflict with national governments. 33 In postwar Britain, NGOs like MCANW and the ASA often occupied a difficult and ambivalent position, as Hilton and others observe, being "at one and the same time a wing of the state, and an agent acting against it." The Cold War context often exacerbated these tensions. The ASA encountered criticism from the British government because its internationalist outlook could at times conflict with British national security interests. Whitehall was particularly skeptical of the association's strong support for the freedom of science across national boundaries, one of the chief underlying principles of ASA proposals for the international control of nuclear energy. Similarly, MCANW-as an affiliate of IPPNW-was subject to accusations of being a pro-Soviet organization because of its striving for the prevention of nuclear war across the blocs. 34 The ASA's adherence to the principle of objectivity and its refusal to adopt a political stance were among the association's chief characteristics, distinguishing it from key organizations within the atomic scientists' movement in the United States, especially the Federation of American Scientists (FAS), but also contributing to its demise and disbandment. 35 Together with ideological motivations, pragmatic reasons were behind the ASA's objective approach. The grass-roots democratic decision-making process in its governing council required unanimous agreement, and political neutrality made it easier to attain unanimity. 36 Councilors' opposing political views and loyalties, as well as an increasing polarization of the scientific community into government loyalists and critics during the early Cold War aggravated the potential for political conflict within the organization. As a result, the ASA came close to enforcing a thoroughly depoliticized approach in order to ensure its continued functionality. 37 MCANW shared some key features of political objectivity with the ASA, vowing in its constitution to be "independent of any political party" and defining itself as a "reference agency for the information" on medical effects of atomic warfare. Unlike the ASA, MCANW followed a more pragmatic approach to decision-making by rejecting the requirement of unanimity. Its governing National Council could "initiate policy decisions" that were then subject to approval by a two-thirds majority at the subsequent annual general meeting. 38 This approach gave MCANW the flexibility to react to current developments. But the ASA and MCANW followed different paths into the political terrain.
The ASA and the International Control of Nuclear Energy, 1945-48
The ASA's efforts to prevent nuclear war through the promotion of the international control of nuclear energy occurred during a formative period of transnational professional anti-nuclear weapons activism that bridged the final phases of the Second World War and the early Cold War. During these years, the "nuclear taboo" was still evolving. While many Britons accepted the use of the atomic bombs against Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, concerns over the deployment of nuclear weaponry grew over the next five years. The UN's decision in 1948 to classify atomic arms as "weapons of mass destruction" in a different category from conventional armaments represented a decisive moment in the establishment of the precept that nuclear weapons must not be used. 39 The ASA's views on nuclear arms reflected the embryonic nature of the "nuclear taboo" in this period: the association did not object to the existence of nuclear arms or to the concept of nuclear deterrence per se. Since the group considered "[t]he problem of outlawing atomic warfare [. . .] in the last analysis" to be "identical with the problem of outlawing war in general"-a rather unrealistic goal-the ASA set out to prevent nuclear war through proposals for the establishment of an international control regime for nuclear energy. 40 The ASA's activism coincided with the emergence of a new wave of internationalism. The recent experiences of two world wars and severe economic problems served as a catalyst for the creation of international organizations with an internationalist agenda-most notably the UN. Ideologically, this postwar internationalism was built on principles of national self-determination as postulated by United States President Franklin Delano Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill in the Atlantic Charter (1941). 41 The presence of nuclear weapons, especially after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, now appeared to make internationalism even more important.
With its promotion of international control, the ASA followed an ambivalent approach to scientific internationalism. The group tapped into traditions of British liberal internationalist thinking from the interwar years. Moreover, it shared key foundations of scientific internationalism, including support for the transnational exchange of scientific knowledge, with other groups within the atomic scientists' movement. 42 Nevertheless, the ASA's agenda also contained elements of what Joseph Manzione calls "bipolar scientific internationalism." The latter found expression in the ASA's prevailing transnational engagement with Western scientists such as the FAS and its predominantly anti-Communist orientation. 43 Like the FAS in the United States, the presence of Stalinism dissuaded the ASA from building closer ties with scientists in the Soviet Union. 44 Partly as a consequence of its pro-Western leanings, the ASA operated within relatively rudimentary "transnational advocacy networks" that linked groups like the Atomic Scientists of Chicago, the FAS, and the National Committee of Atomic Information in the United States. 45 The absence of an IPPNW-style umbrella organization that spanned the two blocs, in the ASA's case, perhaps marked the most striking organizational difference between the association and MCANW. With a view to international control, the ASA collaborated at the national level with the New Commonwealth Committee and the UN Association, as well as transnationally with the FAS. Among other things, the ASA and the FAS reprinted each other's statements in their journals, the Atomic Scientists' News and the FAS-affiliated Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, respectively. 46 This served a two-fold purpose for the ASA: not only was the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists widely read, but its editor Eugene Rabinowitch believed it could serve as a chief forum for fostering internationalism in the early Cold War. 47 FAS members also attended the ASA's first major conference in Oxford in July 1946, where proposals for international control ranked high on the agenda. 48 Given their weakly institutionalized form, these "transnational advocacy networks," which often predated the Second World War, relied heavily on individual personal contacts. From 1911, the Solvay Conferences provided an important forum for the advancement of the relatively small field of theoretical physics, particularly in areas relevant to nuclear science. 49 Research centers represented another site where atomic scientists formed personal contacts. At Leipzig University in Germany, for example, the Manhattan Project scientists Felix Bloch, Klaus Fuchs, Rudolf Peierls, George Placzek, Edward Teller, and Victor Weisskopf had come across each other during the late 1920s and early 1930s as either colleagues or students of Werner Heisenberg. 50 Where atomic scientists, in their support of internationalism, differed from other professional experts was in their personal motivations: many of them grappled with the moral responsibilities that stemmed from their involvement in the creation of nuclear arms in the British and Allied wartime projects and felt complicit because of the use to which their breakthroughs were put. In particular, Hiroshima and Nagasaki forced many Manhattan Project scientists, in the words of Jon Hunner, "to culturally code switch" in order to grasp the atom bomb's moral, cultural, social, and political impacts. 51 To some extent, the situation of many nuclear scientists was comparable to that of chemists such as Fritz Haber who were involved in the development of chemical weapons around the time of the First World War. 52 Yet, their wartime roles also appeared to give atomic scientists moral authority to speak out as authentic insider experts and discuss ways to prevent nuclear war. 53 That much public attention and even blame focused on nuclear scientists after Hiroshima and Nagasaki enabled them to campaign for international control from a media-effective platform. 54 Apart from providing the moral basis for their professional activism, many British Manhattan Project scientists, including future ASA members, also formed their initial views on international control during their stay in the United States, where they witnessed the formation of the American atomic scientists' movement. 55 By September 1945, several of these scientists took a first step toward organizing themselves in a group to work for the prevention of nuclear war. In a letter, they informed Sir James Chadwick, the head of the British mission to the Manhattan Project, of their intention to follow the example of their American colleagues by issuing a declaration to the British government and media on the significance of international control. 56 The following month, these ambitions translated into a "Memorandum from British Scientists at the Los Alamos Laboratory, New Mexico," which arguably represented the first manifestation of a concerted effort to set up a British atomic scientists' organization. While its signatories did not believe that "outlawing" atomic weapons was a feasible choice, they called for "an international organisation or arrangement for the avoidance of war." 57 By acknowledging the American monopoly on nuclear weapons while simultaneously calling for an international body to prevent war, they displayed elements of "bipolar scientific internationalism."
British Manhattan Project scientists brought these ideas and influences back home with them from the United States. In the fall of 1945, several of them formed the Atomic Scientists' Committee (ASC), the direct precursor to the ASA, under the tutelage of the Association of Scientific Workers (AScW) trade union. ASC founding members included J. D. Bernal, Patrick Blackett, Eric Burhop, Harrie Massey, Alan Nunn May, Nevill Mott, Marcus Oliphant, Rudolf Peierls, and Joseph Rotblat. 58 Though the AScW had briefly discussed international control within the context of scientists' social responsibilities after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the ASC now devoted more attention to the issue, laying some programmatic groundwork for the ASA. In November 1945, the committee discussed a "Proposal for the Control of Nuclear Energy." The missive identified nuclear scientists as the actors qualified to "take the kind of action required in the time required" and put forth suggestions for an international conference on international control, an international organization of atomic scientists, and a "World University" with "an international institute for research on near-critical masses." 59 The ASC believed in the capabilities of the UN to implement and police a regime of international control of nuclear energy. It rejected proposals by a group of Liverpool scientists led by Joseph Rotblat and Michael Moore for a world government and a suspension of any research in nuclear science "until mankind [wa]s ready to use scientific achievements for constructive purposes only" in favor of a set of alternative propositions by Eric Burhop. 60 The latter supported plans drawn up during the tripartite meeting of the British, American, and Soviet foreign ministers in Moscow in December 1945-and backed by France, China, and Canada-to establish the UN Atomic Energy Commission (UNAEC). In addition, Burhop called on all nations to abandon plans to obtain nuclear arms, including closing down key research facilities, and to accumulate inventories of fissionable raw materials. Scientists were to promote international control through international conferences and scientific exchange across national boundaries. 61 British atomic scientists remained supportive of the UNAEC after the disbanding of the ASC. 62 By April 1946, shortly after their re-organization in the ASA, Moon, Oliphant, and Peierls drafted a communiqué on international control for submission to the UNAEC. Growing tensions between the superpowers seemed to make such a statement all the more important. Yet, ASA members' divergent political views and the release of the "Acheson-Lilienthal Report" in the United States complicated the drafting of the statement considerably. 63 Like the ASC, the FAS, and the British and United States governments, the ASA regarded the UN as the most suitable institution for implementing and safeguarding a system of international control. 64 But the ASA and the British government disagreed over the framework and terms under which such a scheme should operate. At the heart of this dispute lay the fact that the associationlike the FAS, the New Commonwealth Society, and segments of the British news media-embraced the so-called Baruch Plan. 65 United States President Harry Truman appointed financier Bernard Baruch to present the "Acheson-Lilienthal Plan," as it was originally called, to the UNAEC's first session in June 1946. These proposals promoted international control across a broad range of areas from nuclear weaponry to raw materials such as uranium ore. Baruch, however, amended the plan substantially so that it granted the United States government the right to continue with its nuclear arms research and veto the plan at any time should other nations not implement it properly. Consequently, the Soviet Union rejected the "Baruch Plan" in the UN Security Council, and by the summer of 1946, the concept of international control had failed, marking the start of a nuclear arms race between the superpowers. 66 The ASA's backing of the "Baruch Plan" revealed both the group's bipolar internationalist orientation and the limits it faced in defining the political. The association attempted to abstain from making outwardly political statements on international control. As a consequence, the ASA-unlike the FAS-did not lend its support to the "One World" movement, which envisaged a world government as a means to put an international control scheme into action. 67 Instead, ASA members sympathized with Niels Bohr's supposedly less politicized proposals for an "Open World." 68 Toward the end of World War II, the Danish émigré scientist had argued that a nuclear arms race could only be averted if the British, Soviet, and United States governments reached a tripartite agreement on international control prior to the end of the war and the creation of the first nuclear weapons. 69 If the emerging Cold War now rendered Bohr's wartime proposal to reach an agreement with the Soviet Union political, the same applied to the ASA's support of the "Baruch Plan." The fact that Franklin Lindsay, the executive officer of the United States representative to the UNAEC, assured Philip Moon on behalf of Baruch "that on nearly all the basic points your Association [wa]s in agreement with the United States policy" demonstrates this. 70 Conversely, the ASA's open endorsement of the "Baruch Plan" led British government offices to become suspicious of the association's position on international control. The ASA's view of the UN as "a genuine international super-national body with the will and capacity to act as a sort of super state and to override the Governments of sovereign States" represented, in the eyes of one Foreign Office official, "the common weakness when scientists launch out as prophets in the field of international politics." 71 This critique corresponded with internal views held by several British government departments. Formally, the Attlee Government sanctioned Washington's proposals in 1946-47. But many British government officials simultaneously harbored feelings of mistrust toward the Truman Administration and worried about the negative impact that the implementation of the "Baruch Plan" might have on Britain's civilian and military nuclear programs. 72 This skepticism formed part of a common reluctance that British governments before and after Attlee have displayed toward surrendering sovereignty to supranational bodies. And it increased after the United States Congress had passed the MacMahon Act (1946), which cut off Britain from vital American nuclear data. 73 With negotiations on international control dragging on in the UNAEC until May 1948, the issue remained high on the ASA's agenda. 74 ASA members Chadwick, Cockcroft, Massey, Oliphant, Peierls, and Thomson sat on Chatham House's Atomic Energy Study Group. The international relations think tank operated the panel between September 1946 and the summer of 1948. Given its members' diverse political views and professional backgrounds, as well as Chatham House's overtly nonpolitical mission, the output from the Atomic Energy Study Group took the form of an edited collection of papers that examined the matter from different angles, including nuclear physics, politics, and international relations. 75 Although the implementation of a system of international control was unfeasible and public opinion on the effectiveness of international organizations in stopping the arms race turned more pessimistic, the ASA continued to attach significance to the matter. 76 And the item featured as a major programmatic message in the group's traveling Atom Train exhibition of 1947-48. 77 Moreover, the ASA Council decided in July 1947 to set up a study group, comprising Blackett, Mott, Oliphant, Peierls, and Skinner. 78 The team covered the issue and drafted "non-controversial" articles on the subject. 79 In July 1948, the ASA Council issued a further statement that called for international control but acknowledged the fact that this ASA objective had practically failed in light of growing tensions between the superpowers. 80 Recipients of the statement included the UN secretary-general, the British and Soviet UNAEC representatives, Prime Minister Clement Attlee and other cabinet members, the AScW, and the editor of Nature. 81 The Economist magazine pointed to weaknesses in the association's treatment of political issues, calling the statement "platitudinous," while Nature classed it as "lamentably weak," demonstrating the extent to which the ASA's insistence on objectivity and its concern with international control appeared increasingly out of touch with the realities of the advancing Cold War.
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MCANW and the Study of the Medical Effects of Nuclear War, 1980-85
MCANW's work for the prevention of nuclear war occurred in an entirely different context. By the early 1980s, the "nuclear taboo" was fully established, with anti-nuclear weapons activists now challenging the very notion of nuclear deterrence. Moreover, MCANW operated at a time of widespread anti-nuclear weapons protests. 83 When the so-called Second Cold War started in 1979, the United States' monopoly on atomic weapons had been abolished for some thirty years, and Britain had long possessed its own independent nuclear deterrent. 84 A set of both international and genuinely British political factors helped to initiate the formation of MCANW. MCANW's case illustrates the relationship and dynamics at play between national, transnational, and international issues and initiatives within transnational professional anti-nuclear weapons activism. 85 Like the ASA, but perhaps more demonstratively, MCANW represented a group of "national internationalists," as Holger Nehring classifies organizations with internationalist objectives that they view simultaneously from national perspectives. 86 First and foremost, the global nature of the nuclear threat that transcended national boundaries appeared to require a transnational resolution. More specifically, many medical professionals registered a number of strategic developments in Britain, the United States, and NATO with alarm: in their opinion, the adoption of the concepts of "limited nuclear war" and "counterforce," as well as the deployment of cruise missiles to Britain under the terms of the NATO "double track" decision, made Britain and Europe prime targets in a future nuclear war. In addition, the Thatcher Government's endorsement of the practicability of civil defense and effective medical care during and after nuclear war, as well as its decision to acquire the submarine-based Trident nuclear weapons system, caused consternation among many British medical practitioners. Further dashing hopes for easing tensions between the superpowers was the United States Senate's refusal to ratify the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty II in 1980 in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the election of staunch anti-Communist leaders in Britain (Margaret Thatcher in 1979) and the United States (Ronald Reagan in 1980). 87 Motivated by these developments, medical professionals showed growing concern over the rising likelihood of nuclear war and its medical consequences, leading to MCANW's formation. In June 1980, The Lancet published an influential editorial that called on medical professionals "whose services know no frontiers" to "help by resisting or at least questioning the fomenting of distrust between nations" in the intensifying Cold War. 88 In the fall of the same year, Helen Caldicott, the president of the American Physicians for Social Responsibility (PSR), played a major role in the foundation of the group when she attended a MAPW conference that discussed plans to establish a British version of PSR.
89 By November 1980, MCANW had come into existence with John Humphrey at the helm. 90 Alongside PSR (IPPNW was still undergoing its formation and consolidation process at this time), the World Disarmament Campaign, which Philip Noel-Baker and Fenner Brockway founded in the wake of the resolutions of the UN's First Disarmament Session in 1978, gave another important impulse for the creation of MCANW. 91 From 1982, MCANW also closely cooperated with like-minded professional groups through its role as a major sponsor of Professions for World Disarmament and Development, which constituted a hub for activists from a range of professional backgrounds. 92 MCANW shared some objectives with CND and other groups in the antinuclear weapons mass movement, in particular the rejection of the concept of nuclear deterrence and the quest for multilateral and later also unilateral British nuclear disarmament. 93 In spite of these common goals and the fact that many MCANW members held leftwing political views, the campaign sought to uphold a "separate identity" from the broader anti-nuclear weapons movement. 94 Eventually, MCANW permitted its members to support CND on an individual basis. 95 But the group's commitment to politically neutral objectivity was often ambiguous. For example, MCANW opposed British, American, and NATO nuclear weapons policies and supported the women's peace camp at the Greenham Common air base, where United States Air Force cruise missiles were deployed. Other politicized areas included MCANW's criticism of the Thatcher Government's medical and civil defense planning for nuclear war, as well as the group's advocacy of nuclear nonproliferation, a comprehensive nuclear test ban, and a Nuclear Freeze. 96 One area where MCANW differed fundamentally from the ASA concerned its engagement in more fully formed transnational networks under the aegis of IPPNW, an international NGO, which seemed better equipped to work for the prevention of nuclear war in the Cold War than national ASA-type groups. IPPNW's organizational structure as "a federation" of national affiliates, as IPPNW defined itself in its constitution from 1983, characterized this advanced transnational make-up. An International Council, which comprised representatives from all affiliates, governed IPPNW. 97 With their high level of transnationalism that permeated the Iron Curtain, MCANW and IPPNW were also less rooted in "bipolar scientific internationalism" than the ASA.
The evolution of the MCANW/IPPNW network formed part of a longer developmental process of transnational medical and scientific activism after 1948. It gathered momentum during the nuclear test ban debate of the 1950s when the ASA and groups of the atomic scientists' movement in the United States like the FAS and the Committee for Nuclear Information, as well as MAPW, warned against the environmental and health effects of radioactive fallout from nuclear testing. These activities produced two major outcomes: first, they prepared some of the ground for the emergence of the first cycle of antinuclear weapons activism, particularly CND. Second, they led to the creation in 1957 of the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs (PCSWA), which represented a chief transnational forum for nuclear and other disarmament issues across the Iron Curtain and influenced the formation of IPPNW. 98 Within some two years of IPPNW's inception, IPPNW and the press ambitiously compared the new organization to the long-standing PCSWA. 99 While the FAS formed a Committee for Foreign Correspondence to create links with Soviet scientists in the late 1940s, it was the PCSWA that established a crucial platform for transnational exchanges between scientists in the two blocs about nuclear disarmament and other issues. 100 The PCSWA benefitted from the death of Soviet leader Joseph Stalin and the subsequent "Khrushchev thaw" in the Soviet Union because these events now enabled Soviet scientific and medical professionals to engage more actively with transnational networks. 101 In hindsight, IPPNW's comparison with the PCSWA appears to be justified, for the PCSWA marked a crucial step in the development of transnational professional anti-nuclear weapons activism, providing an institutional link between the ASA and MCANW/IPPNW. Moreover, the PCSWA also served as a major inspiration for MCANW and IPPNW, and a connection existed between the ASA and the PCSWA through strong staff links. The association cooperated with the PCSWA from their start in 1957. When the ASA was drawing its last breath in 1959, Joseph Rotblat, a key player in the association and the PCSWA (and later also a supporter of IPPNW), took a leading role in establishing closer ties between the two organizations. 102 What is more, many ASA members joined the PCSWA after their association had disbanded in 1959. 103 Above and beyond organizational links, MCANW, the PCSWA, and the ASA shared a set of similar issues around the national and international allegiances of their members. The ASA had already been criticized by the British government for its limited internationalism, but the PCSWA and MCANW were much more deeply engaged with networks that transcended the two blocs and therefore faced a much more complex situation. In particular, Soviet members, who normally belonged to the Soviet Academies of Sciences or Medical Sciences and required government approval to attend PCSWA and IPPNW meetings, undercut the claim of these two organizations to be independent expert bodies. As a consequence, political analyst Leonard Schwartz pointed to difficulties in defining whether PCSWA conferences, or in fact IPPNW congresses, were "'officially unofficial or unofficially official.'" 104 But IPPNW's entanglement with Soviet government institutions also led British tabloids like the Daily Express to stigmatize the transnational network as "a bogus organisation, doing more for Soviet propaganda than for peace." 105 This accusation exemplified a prejudice that groups of the peace movement often encountered in Cold War Britain. 106 MCANW's transnational activism for the prevention of nuclear war manifested itself perhaps in its most visible form through the group's role within the IPPNW "federation," especially annual international conferences. As in the case of the PCSWA, international congresses represented major sites of transnational exchanges and communication for IPPNW. Here, IPPNW and the PCSWA followed in the tradition of earlier transnational groups of medical peace activists such as Joseph Rivière and the International Medical Association against War (1905) or the International Medical Association for the Prevention of War (1936) . 107 Simultaneously, these meetings were important markers of ongoing changes in MCANW's anti-nuclear weapons activism.
Shortly after IPPNW's formation in June 1980, plans for its first international conference were under way. 108 Entitled "Last Aid: the Medical Dimensions of Nuclear War," the first IPPNW World Congress took place near Washington, DC, in 1981. In light of the perceived imminence of nuclear war, the meeting focused on the medical effects of nuclear war and marked an important step in the development of transnational medical anti-nuclear weapons activism, particularly the consolidation of its main hub and the formulation of an agenda. British delegates included John Boag, Jack Fielding, Andrew Haines, and Patricia Lindop. 109 In addition, the conference helped MCANW to raise its profile within the IPPNW network because the umbrella organization accepted a British proposal to hold the subsequent IPPNW conference in Cambridge, England.
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IPPNW's Second World Congress, which MCANW organized with support from MAPW in April 1982, epitomized major shifts in transnational professional anti-nuclear weapons activism that had taken place since the days when the ASA promoted international control, particularly in response to the intensifying nuclear arms race of the Second Cold War, in relation to higher levels of transnational engagement and the articulation of stronger political statements. Sir Douglas Black, the president of the Royal College of Physicians; Bernard Lown; and Nikita Blokhin, the President of the Soviet Academy of Medical Sciences, cochaired the Cambridge meeting, which was attended by some two hundred delegates from over thirty Eastern and Western bloc countries and nonaligned nations. 111 Although the Argentinian invasion of the Falkland/Malvinas Islands on the eve of the conference eclipsed the publicity of the event, it still received coverage in the press and medical journals. In fact, MCANW effectively used it as an opportunity to launch its first major advertisement in the national press. 112 Given the mounting tensions between the superpowers, the conference focused on the medical effects that nuclear war might have on the densely populated European continent, with its high degree of urbanization and complex infrastructure. 113 Among other things, working groups discussed issues pertinent to the development of transnational medical activism. These included the recruitment of members from all areas of the health services and campaigning at the national level, as well as constitutional changes to IPPNW's governance structure.
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At the end of the Cambridge meeting, delegates issued "An Appeal to the Physicians of Europe," addressing the development of the IPPNW network. In support of IPPNW's mission, the statement proposed that physicians across Europe should either engage in the work of its existing affiliates or set up new ones. Furthermore, it urged them to study the medical effects of nuclear war and disseminate related information to the public, the media, and political decisionmakers. Finally, the statement set out to encourage European health professionals to network with their colleagues at home and abroad, a key prerequisite for expanding IPPNW.
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Another important resolution concerned IPPNW's programmatic orientation as an expert organization. In a politicized move that jeopardized the credibility and status of IPPNW and its affiliates as objective experts, delegates adopted an alternative Hippocratic Oath modeled on the "Frankfurt Declaration" by the West German IPPNW section. 116 Although the Hippocratic Oath, as an ethical legitimization for medical anti-nuclear weapons activism, was less significant for MCANW, which did not even mention it in its constitution, than it was for its American and West German sister organizations or for IPPNW, the new pledge went to the heart of the fundamental debate over war medicine, thus affecting MCANW. 117 One section of the document that justified physicians' right to "object to any kind of training or advanced training in war medicine and refuse to participate in it" proved particularly problematic. Not only did it contravene IPPNW's policy on objectivity, but critics interpreted the statement as a potential refusal by medical professionals to intervene in or engage in any training for actual medical emergencies beyond nuclear war, including even natural catastrophes. In West Germany, the "Frankfurt Declaration" consequently prompted calls to revoke signatories' licenses to practice medicine. 118 In Britain, it appeared to confirm fears that the IPPNW had become politicized, as expressed by John Horder, the president of the Royal College of General Practitioners, ahead of the Cambridge meeting. 119 These negative reactions to IPPNW and MCANW policies demonstrated the extent to which the civil defense issue polarized the medical profession into critics and supporters of government policy. Through their roles in civil defense planning, community physicians were at the center of this debate. MCANW's critique of British government plans initially centered on two Home Office policies: the "Protect and Survive" civil defense campaign and the plans for operating British health services during and after nuclear attack in line with the "Home Defence Circular (77) 1" policy document. 120 The group showed concern about the optimistic assessment of the medical consequences of nuclear war by government agencies, especially their suggestion that effective civil defense against such an attack was, in principle, possible. 121 To study the effectiveness of civil defense from a medical point of view, MCANW had formed a joint Civil Defence Working Group with MAPW in 1981, which published the booklet The Medical Consequences of Nuclear Weapons the following year. 122 In formulating an official line on civil defense, MCANW struggled, once again, with defining the political. In November 1982, the group passed resolutions that undermined government policy, declaring that civil defense had "no significant effect in protecting the population from direct nuclear attack." At the same time, MCANW was more cautious than the West German IPPNW section in its "Frankfurt Declaration" because the British group differentiated explicitly between unrestricted support for general "disaster planning" and the individual medical professional's right to object "on grounds of conscience" to any "participation in planning for nuclear war." 123 Despite these nuances, the British government rejected MCANW's views on civil defense.
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MCANW's ambiguous stance on civil defense reflected the growing politicization of the civil defense issue and of the medical profession more generally. The British Medical Association (BMA), the main representational body and trade union of medical professionals in Britain, played an important role in this process; its indecisiveness on civil defense and unilateral British nuclear disarmament fueled a discussion within MCANW about the campaign's purpose and political mindedness. 125 Central to the BMA's involvement in the civil defense debate was a report by its Board of Science and Education that undermined the official government line on civil defense: The Medical Effects of Nuclear War concluded that the health services would be unable to cope with the consequences of a nuclear attack. After a prolonged debate at the BMA's 1983 annual representative meeting, delegates approved of the report's findings despite their subversive message. Yet, they also acted ambivalently when they voted in favor of the BMA's abstention from taking a political stance in the nuclear debate, that is from commenting on government policies "concerning the manufacture, testing and development of nuclear weapons." Instead, the meeting carried a resolution that promoted a multilateral nuclear freeze. In this way, the 1983 meeting established the ground rules for the BMA's participation in the nuclear debate of the 1980s: the association would restrict itself to the provision of factual information and refrain from actively supporting MCANW and IPPNW. 126 At its annual general meeting in June 1983, MCANW followed the BMA's resolution, and delegates decided against the adoption of a unilateralist line on British nuclear disarmament in order not to alienate members, "even whilst recognizing that 'unilateral' meant taking an initiative." Instead, the same meeting backed a resolution issued by IPPNW's Third World Congress that urged international governments to implement a multilateral freeze on nuclear weapons production, testing, and siting, as well as the production of delivery systems, with the ultimate goal of abolishing atomic arms altogether. Furthermore, delegates called on the Thatcher Government to advocate a multilateral freeze in the upcoming UN Special Session on Disarmament and to cancel plans for the purchase of Trident and the deployment of cruise missiles on British soil, thereby linking unilateral British nuclear disarmament with multilateral nuclear disarmament.
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MCANW's and the BMA's prioritization of multilateral over unilateral nuclear disarmament was pragmatic. Although the early 1980s witnessed an increase in perceived fears of nuclear war and a mobilization of the anti-nuclear weapons movement, MCANW's anti-nuclear weapons activism struggled against the tide of public opinion. The defeat of the Labour Party, which ran on a unilateralist ticket in the 1983 general election, illustrated the trend in public sentiment. Despite short-lived, mainstream disapproval of Trident and cruise missiles, a majority of Britons eventually put up with the deployment of these weapons systems. 128 Multilateralism thus seemed to go down more favorably with mainstream public opinion than an orthodox unilateralist stance.
MCANW continued to follow a more depoliticized line for another year or so, before abandoning it by late 1984. This move went hand in hand with a diversification of the group's agenda to incorporate the broader issues of social inequality, public health, and foreign aid. 129 These changes occurred in tandem with programmatic developments within IPPNW and the BMA and mirrored a general trend amongst British NGOs. At its Fourth World Congress in 1984, IPPNW started to widen its agenda to include the study of weapons of mass destruction more broadly. 130 The fact that IPPNW amended its constitution the following year, referring to itself now as a "'non-partisan'" rather than a "'nonpolitical'" organization, appeared to sanction the release of stronger value statements from MCANW. 131 The BMA, too, legitimized MCANW's development into a multi-issue campaign with stronger political views. In 1984, its annual representative meeting overrode its previous decision to abstain from issuing political statements, calling instead for a world-wide re-allocation of funding from defense to health service. But by framing this antimilitarist argument multilaterally, the BMA aimed to make it more acceptable to its membership base with its diverse political leanings. 132 And this move illustrates the limits of the association's more politically minded approach.
In September 1985, MCANW combined these lines of development in its first national campaign. "Treatment Not Trident" called on the British government to shelve its plans for procuring the Trident nuclear weapons system and to divert these funds toward health care and foreign aid. 133 These developments not only demonstrate how transnational professional anti-nuclear weapons activism had come about between the late 1940s and the early 1980s but also how it continued to shift in the mid-1980s. Given the context of the Second Cold War, MCANW's activism for the prevention of nuclear war displayed both greater transnational engagement and politicization than the ASA in its quest to promote international control during the late 1940s. And, what is more, MCANW started to evolve into a multi-issue campaign from the mid-1980s.
Conclusions
A comparative analysis of the ASA's and MCANW's efforts to prevent nuclear war at two pivotal moments of the Cold War reveals key aspects of the roles that professionals played in this movement and exposes major shifts in transnational professional activism. The threat of nuclear war provided the abstract contextual frame for their activities. While the two groups shared a general, anti-nuclear orientation rooted in their occupational roles in the preparations for nuclear warfare, their moral regimes differed significantly as a result of the very different Cold War contexts in which they acted.
The ASA promoted the international control of nuclear energy to avoid a nuclear arms race and, ultimately, nuclear war during a transformative period for transnational professional activism. In the late 1940s, the United States held a monopoly on nuclear weapons, many scientists were still attempting to make sense of atomic arms, and the notion of the "nuclear taboo" had only started to emerge. In this context, the ASA did not categorically object to the existence of nuclear weapons and the concept of nuclear deterrence. Moreover, the ASA's engagement with transnational networks was still relatively rudimentary, displaying elements of a predominantly pro-Western and anti-Communist "bipolar scientific internationalism."
By contrast, MCANW's activism took place during the Second Cold War, which was characterized by relatively strong anti-nuclear weapons protests and an intensifying nuclear arms race. The group studied the medical effects of atomic warfare and applied, in line with its members' professional ethos, concepts from preventative medicine to the nuclear arms race. Unlike the ASA, MCANW challenged the concept of nuclear deterrence itself, calling for multilateral and later also more explicitly unilateral British nuclear disarmament. In this way, MCANW's views partly resembled those of other anti-nuclear weapons groups such as CND. In any case, in comparison to the ASA, MCANW was significantly more politicized.
In their quest to prevent nuclear war, these two groups of "progressive professionals" relied on their professional expertise. Yet, they struggled to define the political. The ASA generally adhered to a strict line on objectivity in political matters and remained a single-issue campaign until its end in 1959. 134 In this sense, the association differed from other atomic scientists' groups, especially the FAS, which had diversified its objectives by the early 1950s. 135 In contrast to the ASA, MCANW issued relatively politicized statements. Moreover, from 1984 on, the group, in conjunction with IPPNW, also started to investigate broader issues, such as health spending in relation to defense expenditure on both nuclear and conventional armaments. After the end of the Cold War, MCANW took a most pragmatic step to ensure its survival when the group merged with MAPW in 1992 to form the multi-issue campaign Medical Action for Global Security (MEDACT), which remains Britain's sole IPPNW affiliate today. 136 Although the ASA and MCANW intended to stay clear of any political entanglement in order not to jeopardize their status as "professional elites," the Cold War framework occasionally politicized some of their supposedly nonpolitical statements. And, what is more, the two groups also frequently compromised their depoliticized approaches. The ASA clashed with the Attlee Government over its support of the "Baruch Plan." Similarly, MCANW's criticism of official planning for medical care in the event of nuclear war, including civil defense measures, brought the group into conflict with the Thatcher Government. The fact that several ASA members also held posts at British government research facilities and community physicians in MCANW were involved in civil defense planning further complicated the situation for these two groups.
Finally, the two groups were characterized by fundamentally different levels of engagement with transnational networks. Through its membership in the IPPNW "federation," an international NGO, with a sophisticated governance structure and established channels of transnational communication across two blocs, MCANW displayed a much deeper involvement in such networks than the ASA. In this context, the PCSWA marked both a key model for IPPNW and an organizational link between the ASA and MCANW/IPPNW; many ASA members joined Pugwash when their association disbanded, and MCANW/IPPNW drew inspiration from the PCSWA. The fact that IPPNW received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1985-only five years after its inception and ten years before the PCSWA-serves as an indicator of the relevance and high level of the transnational activism that medical professionals displayed in the early 1980s by comparison with atomic scientists in the immediate postwar years.
137
Endnotes
The author wishes to thank Mark Peel for his encouragement to pursue this topic, Jennifer Haynes, Elena Carter (both at the Wellcome Library), and Alison Cullingford (University of Bradford) for tracking down archival materials, as well as Tom as Irish, Emma Cavell, and the article's anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments on earlier drafts. The research for this article was in part funded through the generous support of a Wellcome Small Grant in Medical Humanities (106456/Z/14/Z). Address correspondence to Christoph Laucht, Department of History, Swansea University, Singleton Park, Swansea, SA2 8PP, Wales, United Kingdom. Email: c.laucht@swansea.ac.uk. 
